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Section 45 provides: "In any case of two or more organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether
or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affili-
ated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same in-
terests, the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion,
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such organization, trades, or businesses."
Even though the regulations under Section 45 state that the
purpose of the Section is not to effect a result equivalent to a
computation of consolidated net income under Section 141, the
Commissioner has contended that Section 45 should apply where
several organizations are under common control. In the case of
Grenada Industries, Inc., 17 T. C. No. 28, four organizations were
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
but the Court holds that the allocation of the income of one to
another was arbitrary and not authorized under Section 45 (ex-
cept in one instance). The Court held that despite the intertwin-
ing relationships, one company paid and received fair market
prices as though its transactions had been carried on with strang-
ers and, the Court stated, "No more could be expected of it".
The Court further stated: "The purpose of Section 45 is not
to punish the mere existence of common control or ownership but
to assist in preventing distortion of income and evasion of taxes
through the exercise of that control or ownership. It is where
there is a shift or deflection of income from one controlled unit to
another that the Commissioner is authorized under Section 45 to
act to right the balance and to keep tax collections unimpaired".
The proposed Revenue Act of 1951, passed by the House and
now in the Senate, provides among other things that there shall
be only one excess profit tax credit allotted to a group of corpora-
tions having a designated common ownership. The details of this
act have not been resolved and it is not determined what percentage
of ownership will apply.
NEGLIGENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY
IN RESCUE CASES'
FRANCIS K. RISKO and MAXIM E. EHRLICH *
"As a consequence of the high regard for human life which
is prevalent in all civilized societies, it has become a well settled
principle of our law that the rigor of the rules incident to the doc-
trine of contributory negligence will be relaxed in favor of one
who sacrifices himself in the rescue of a fellow man in distress."
'2
This article deals only with rescue of persons.
Written while students at the University of Denver College of Law.
2 9 Va. Law R. 376 (1922).
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By 1910 it was clearly established that a volunteer who acted
instinctively in an attempt to save a human life endangered by the
negligence of another could recover for injuries.3 The Wagner
case 4 extended this doctrine to cases of volitional and even delib-
erate conduct, so long as that conduct be not rash or reckless. In
that case, Justice Cordozo set forth the new and startling theory
that danger invites rescue. He further stated, "the wrong that
imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also
to his rescuer." The Wagner case 5 has been followed in many
jurisdictions, 6 and seems to be good law today, where the attempted
rescue is of a person and not property.
The situation in which this doctrine is applicable arises when
one, by his negligence, puts another in danger of being injured
or losing his life, and some third party attempts to rescue the
imperiled party. The recent case of Brugh v. Bigelow 7 has even
applied the rescue doctrine where the defendant placed himself
in peril and a passerby stopped and attempted to aid him. The
passerby, as plaintiff, recovered from the defendant for injuries
suffered in the attempted rescue. The court held for the plaintiff
even though the act of the defendant had to be held as negligence
toward himself. Thus it seems evident that there need be no duty
toward a known party; indeed, if the holding of the Brugh case be
followed, there need to no duty at all! This seems to be the
furthest extent to which the danger invites rescue doctrine could
be applied. Applying the reasoning of the above case, it would
appear that in any situation where a human life is in a perilous
position due to the negligence of the defendant, the party who is
injured while attempting to rescue the one imperiled may recover
for his injuries.
"LIMITATIONS"
The rescue doctrine, however, has its qualifications. First,
the danger must appear imminent and real, and not merely imag-
inary or speculative. The appearance of reality and imminence
must exist at the time the rescuer takes action. This is a matter
to be determined by the jury. It has been held 8 that the apparent
imminence of danger sufficient to induce a belief that action is
necessary and to impel an attempt to rescue the one supposedly
in peril is to be measured by the standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances, or the manner in which an ordinarily
prudent person would act in the same or similar circumstances.
3 Dixon v. N. Y., N. Haven & Hartford R. R., 207 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 1030
(1910); Ridley v. Mobile and Ohio R. R., 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S. W. 606 (1905);
Eckert v. L. I. R. R., 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Corbin v. Philadelphia,
195 Pa. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900).
'Wagner v. Inter'l R. R. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
'Supra, n. 4.
See cases collected in 158 A. L. R. 189.
1310 Mich. 74, 16 N. W. 2d 668 (1944).
'Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P. 2d 631 (1932); Wolf-
inger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N. W. 731 (1940) ; Arnold v. Northern States
Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N. W. 182 (1941).
DICTA
Oct., 1951
Second, the dangerous condition must not have been brought about
by the rescuer. This qualification is, of course, obvious, for if one
could recover for a rescue attempt in a perilous situation created
by his own negligence, he would be, in effect, making another pay
for his own wrong. It is essential, in order to permit a recovery
upon the theory of rescue, to show that the negligence of the
defendant and not the rescuer was the proximate cause of injury
or death.9 It must be pointed out that the proximate cause men-
tioned here is proximate cause of the injury or death, and, con-
sequently, the perilous position of the party the rescuer, who is
now plaintiff, sought to aid. This further illustrates that no duty
was owing to the rescuer. The only legal duty owing at all was
from the tortfeasor to the imperiled party not to injure him. Once
that duty has been breached it is a breach as to anyone who be-
comes a rescuer.
Assuming a situation in which the rescue doctrine would
apply and a rescuer acts pursuant to the above qualifications,
the question now arises as to the manner of his acting. He must
not act rashly, recklessly or with wanton disregard for his own
safety.1 0 Whether or not the attempt to rescue was so rash as
to constitute contributory negligence was held in the Wagner case 11
to be a question for the jury.
AVAILABLE DEFENSES
The next problem to be faced is probably the most difficult
and lengthy in the rescue doctrine. This problem concerns the
defenses available to the negligent defendant. If he has not been
negligent, the answer is clear; there is no cause of action. If he
has been negligent, and we assume here that he has, the defendant's
most tenable defenses are: (1) contributory negligence of the
rescuer; (2) assumption of the risk by the rescuer. The rule that
one who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through the
negligence of another cannot be charged with contributory negli-
gence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life or serious injury
in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not rashly
or recklessly made, is supported by many cases. 1 2 The risk of an
attempted rescue may be so great or the chance of its success so
slight as to make it unreasonable to attempt it even though a
human life is at stake; the less the danger to the third party, the
less the risk the plaintiff may reasonably encounter. This is the
view taken by the American Law Institute 13 and was followed
'Bacon v. Payne, 220 Mich. 672, 190 N. W. 716 (1922).
"OWright v. Atlantic R. R. Co., 110 Va. 670, 66 S. E. 848 (1910); Da Rin v.
Casualty Co. of Am., 41 Mont. 175, 108 P. 649 (1910).
" SuDra, n. 4.
'-Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F. 2d 687 (C. C. C. 6th 1942) ; Roach v. L. A. and
Salt Lake R. R. Co., 74 Utah 545, 280 P. 1053 (1929) ; Christiansen v. L. A. &
Salt Lake R. R. Co., 77 Utah 85, 291 P. 926 (1930) ; Bernardine v. N. Y., 268
App. Div. 444, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1944) ; Walters v. Denver Cons. Elec. Light Co.,
12 Colo. App. 14, 54 P. 960 (1898).
"Restatement of Torts, sec. 472.
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in a 1940 Connecticut case. 14 The court therein stated that the
mere presence of danger creating a desire to save a person from
injury or death is not alone sufficient to justify application of the
rescue doctrine, for to venture life where there is no possibility
of saving or where the danger is not great or the possibility of
loss serious may go beyond the limit of that which is legally per-
missible.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In order to invoke the rescue doctrine successfully and es-
tablish freedom from contributory negligence as a matter of law,
it is only necessary for the rescuer to show that he acted as a
reasonably prudent person 15 would have acted under the same or
similar circumstances. It appears the law itself makes allow-
ances, for the human instincts which prompt people to attempt
to aid others in danger spurs the law to widen the permissible
margin of error in judgment, requiring practically a certainty
of death or injury in order to render a rescuer guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. The rescuer acting
with due care is almost certain to get his case before a jury.
The rescuer is looked on with favor by the courts. If he acts
prudently and the situation he enters was not so obviously incon-
sequential as to require his being precluded from proceeding, he will
surely get to the jury for consideration of his evidence. This
appears to be an exception to the ordinary rule of contributory
negligence, for this defense will avail a defendant nothing unless
certain definite circumstances appear-namely, that the rescuer
was rash or reckless. The law seems to offer a rescuer this protec-
tion due to his spirit of sacrifice. It must be remembered that this
exception is one of social policy, and it applies only where the defen-
dant's act brought about the situation, there was imminent peril to
a life, and the plaintiff acted.
In Brown v. Columbia Amusement Co., 6 the court stated the
general rule to be that a person who is injured in the rescue or
attempted rescue of another who has been placed in a perilous
situation by the negligence of a third party may recover from
that negligent person as though the negligence constituted a breach
of duty directly toward him, and that the presumption exists that
the rescuer was impelled by the dictates of humanity, which alone
are sufficient to send the plaintiff's case to the jury, unless it
should appear that the situation was so dangerous that he ought,
as a prudent man, to have known that'he could not escape injury
or death.
It can thus be seen how far courts will go to give aid to the
rescuer. In effect, these cases almost wipe out contributory negli-
gence as a defense, for rashness or recklessness must be shown to
avoid a recovery by the plaintiff. This is something more than
14 Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 16 A. 2d 595 (1940).
13Again it must be remembered that this is a jury question.
"1 91 Mont. 174, 6 P. 2d 874 (1931).
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negligence, and is apparently an exception to the usual rules of
contributory negligence. The case of Lolti v. Market St. Railway
Co.1 7 points this up very well. This case held specifically that
though the general rule is that one who is aware of danger and
neglects to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury is not per-
mitted to recover, there is a limitation, for example, where one
seeks to rescue another person from imminent peril.
"ASSUMPTION OF RISK"
The second defense is that of voluntary assumption of risk
by the plaintiff rescuer. The Wagner case Is seems to have been
the first to set up the principle that opportunity for deliberation
before the rescuer acts will not, as a matter of law, preclude
recovery on the theory of assumption of risk. This case has been
followed and cited by many courts, and the proposition involved
is good law today. Before this case, it had been held 19 that the
rescuer should act spontaneously and without chance to deliberate
as to a course of action. This departure from the past thus dis-
posed of what had formerly been an important consideration
(spontaneity) and went further than any previous case had gone.
A 1904 Texas case,20 discussing the problems of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk together declared,
While it is true that one assumes the risk of injuries that
might result from a voluntary exposure to known dan-
gers, the same rule that would excuse him from the charge
of contributory negligence in the effort to save life would
relieve him from an application of the doctrine of as--
sumed risk. Of course he assumes the risk in the sense
that he voluntarily encounters peril, but if there is any
force or logic in the rule that would excuse one from
contributory negligence in the attempt to save life, we
see no reason why the same rule would not apply-in deny-
ing an application of the doctrine of assumed risk. Neither
contributory negligence nor assumption of risk will de-
feat a recovery where the party injured or killed risks
his life to save the life of another, under circumstances
showing that his conduct was not rash or reckless.
This case was decided even before the departure from the spon-
taneity test. If true then, surely it would be doubly true when,
as now, even deliberation will not set up assumption of risk as
a preclusion of recovery as a matter of law.
It appears that if the rescuer is in apprehension of real danger
to the third party and acts not rashly or recklessly, in other words,
does not enter a hopeless situation, the chances of a successful
17 43 Calif. App. 2d 166, 110 P. 2d 436 (1941).
Supra, n. 4.
19 Eckert v. L. I. R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Central
R. R. v. Crosby, 74 Ga. 737 (1885); Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506 (1879).
20International & Gr. Northern R. R. Co. v. McVey, Tex. Civ. App., 81 S.
W. 991 (1904). This case seems to be good law today. It was, however, reversed
on the question of excessive damages.
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defense are almost nil. This rule is founded on social policy and
tends to encourage persons to aid others in danger. True, no en-
couragement is needed where the act is spontaneous, for one
doesn't stop to think over the pros and cons of acting. It does,
however, practically abrogate the assumption of risk defense where
one thinks over his act and then enters the situation to aid an-
other. The law there offers aid to those who seek to effect a
rescue.
Though this doctrine of danger inviting rescue was much
discussed immediately after the Wagner case, 21 it has become a
well settled principle and is universally followed. It is the child
of this society, and exists to promote harmony and cooperation
among persons. The writers submit that it is a healthy rule, and
one which may lead into more and more law based on social policy,
law made by courts and not legislatures. The law that danger
invites rescue, "made" by Justice Cardozo in the Wagner case,
22
has effected a great change in the legal view of negligence and
breaches of duty. This doctrine has extended the duty of due care
in one's actions. If one places another in peril, his duty to the
world has not ceased. He is liable to anyone who is injured in
attempting to effect a rescue, while, of course, not acting rashly
or recklessly. As an example, if X by his negligence in operation
of his automobile injures another and places him in peril, X's
negligence continues until rescue is effected. He is liable to any
rescuer who acts with reason, that is, in apprehension of real and
imminent danger to the imperiled party, and whose conduct is not
rash, reckless or in wanton disregard for his own safety. The
writers submit that the rescue doctrine places responsibility for
the consequences of a choice made by the plaintiff upon the one
(the defendant) who put him (the plaintiff) in the dilemma of
choosing between safety for himself or aid to a fellow man.
The implications of Brugh v. Bigelow 23 are tremendous in
scope, for that case makes a party responsible to any rescuer, even
where that party places only himself in peril. In that case the
driver of an automobile, through his own careless or negligent
driving, placed himself in peril. The plaintiff attempted to aid
upon hearing the driver's plea for help. In effecting the rescue,
the plaintiff was injured. The defendant's contention, that there
could be no negligence since he owed himself no duty not to injure
himself, was rejected. The court, in rejecting this argument,
stated, "We can make no such distinction of duty in defining the
duties of drivers of automobiles on the highways of this state ...
Defendant's claim that he owed himself and his rescuer no duty
is without merit. His cries for help belied his claimed freedom
from duty.2 4" This case, decided as recently as 1944, is the furthest
the rescue doctrine has been extended.
.Supra, n. 4.
Supra, n. 4.
23 Supra, n. 7.
24 Supra, n. 7.
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